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The objective of this paper is to provide an introduction to the economics of
controlling the stock of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere. The paper starts with a
brief summary of the arguments against a wait-and-see strategy and in favour of
controlling carbon emissions. It then provides a basic analysis of the effect of carbon
tax on net-cash flow maximising agents’ emissions and offers two possible ways for
setting the tax rate. The first one computes an atmospheric carbon-dioxide stocktargeting tax rate with abstinence of some agents, whereas the second considers
universal cooperation and computes a welfare-maximising carbon-tax rate. While
these computations assume a fixed rate of depletion of the atmospheric stock of
carbon dioxide, the last section takes the depletion rate to be dependent on the
distribution of the usable land between plants and humans and the change in the
usable land to be dependent on the change in the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock.
The usable land allocation required for achieving a target stock of atmospheric carbon
dioxide is subsequently computed. (JEL Q52, Q54)
Keywords: Emissions; Carbon-Cycle Imbalance; Atmospheric Carbon Stock; Global
Warming; Usable land: Control Measures; Carbon Tax; Plants-Humans Land
Allocation

1. The Carbon-Cycle’s Imbalance and Its Expected Implications
Carbon emissions are essential for life. In their absence, Earth would become an icy
planet. However, excessive concentration of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere would
render Earth a hot, desolate planet. Global warming is a process where emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) create conditions that lead to a rise in the temperature of
the surface of the planet and subsequently to climate change. The principal GHG is
Carbon Dioxide. It is responsible for about eighty percents of the green-house effect.
Hence, the accumulation of GHGs reflects mainly the imbalance in the atmospheric
carbon cycle—the emissions of CO2 by humans, animals and bacteria beyond the
level absorbed by plants through photosynthesis. Per capita, the largest emitters of
CO2 are the rich industrialized countries (see Levy et al., 2011, for international
comparison).
Monthly measurements of carbon-dioxide concentration in the troposphere
have begun by Charles Keeling in 1958 at the astronomical observatory below the
summit of Mt. Mauna Loa (4,169 m) in Hawaii. Taken far away from major source
and sink sites of carbon-dioxide, those measurements provide a good assessment of

the Earth’s background level of atmospheric carbon-dioxide. They form The Keeling
Curve, which is displayed in Figure 1. The oscillations around this curve reflect
seasonal variations of the imbalance between humans, animals and bacteria aggregate
carbon-dioxide emissions, on the one hand, and absorption of carbon dioxide by
plants, on the other hand, in the land-wise larger and more populated northern
hemisphere.

Figure 1. The Keeling Curve
Source: National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department
of Commerce, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/
Analyses of bubbles trapped in ice-cores extracted from Antarctica have
provided indications of concentrations of carbon dioxide in Earth’s atmosphere during
the earlier 600,000 years. As can be seen from Figure 2, when contrasted with the
deep historical concentration levels, the Keeling Curve reveals unprecedented levels
and rate of accumulation of atmospheric carbon dioxide from about 280 particles per
million on the eve of the Industrial Revolution (1750 AD) to 380 particles per million
in 2010. The industrialization and modernisation of the developing countries and the
2

deforestation of tropical lands by logging and clearing for cash-crops intensify the
imbalance in the carbon cycle and strengthen the aforesaid trend.

Figure 2. Historical carbon-dioxide concentrations derived from EPICA (in blue) and
Vostok (in green) ice cores and The Keeling Curve (in red)
Source: http://planetforlife.com/co2history/index.html
Figure 3 reveals a high level of positive correlation between temperature
variation from the present level and carbon-dioxide concentration in the atmosphere.
The equilibrium climate sensitivity—the global average surface warming of Earth
following a doubling of the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere—is assessed to be
most likely about three degrees Celsius. The subsequent adverse effect of this
equilibrium climate sensitivity on the level of global output in the twenty-second
century is assessed to be only a few percents, hence negligible in present value. This
assessment might lend support to a wait-and-see strategy. However, due to the
compounded uncertainty embedded in the assembly of the components of the used
benefit-cost models, the upper-tail of the probability density function of the Earth’s
surface-temperature change might be fat (Weitzman, 2009, 2011). An increase of six
degrees Celsius, rather than the expected three, in the Earth’s surface average
temperature will deprive massive populations of the river-water supply that has been
essential for their existence. A six-degree Celsius rise will also dilute major ocean
conveyers. Another argument against a wait-and-see strategy is irreversibility. Since
carbon-dioxide emissions remain in the atmosphere for many years, the implications
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of decisions on current emissions for the stock of GHGs are difficult-to-reverse.
Moreover, the warming of the oceans causes acidification of their waters, hence
reduces their absorptive capacity of carbon-dioxide and increases the possibility of a
release of another slowly depleted GHG, methane hydrate, from the continent shelves
to the atmosphere.

Figure 3. Carbon dioxide and dust concentration and surface temperature variation
Source: Vostok_Petit_data.svg file
2. Market-Based Control of Carbon Emissions
Intergenerational ethics and, subsequently, sense of responsibility, ensures assignment
of significant weights to future benefits and costs by the present generation. In the
absence of such ethics and sense of responsibility current emissions of carbon-dioxide
into the atmosphere by one agent are excessive and impose negative external effects
on other agents and future generations by aggravating the imbalance in the carbon
cycle and increasing the stock of atmospheric green-house gasses. Failure of private
initiatives to set markets for negative external effects justifies public intervention. The
Coase Theorem implies that, as long as transaction costs are sufficiently low, some
4

negative externalities can be moderated by assignment of property rights. However,
the atmosphere is indivisible: it belongs to all and no one. Moreover, emissions spread
and the sources of their atmospheric concentration in any given location are
numerous. Thus, transaction costs, if assignment of property rights were possible, are
very high.
The control instruments of carbon emissions (and GHGs in general) at the
disposal of local, national and international policy makers are classified as standards
or market-based instruments. The set of market-based instruments includes emission
trading schemes, emission taxes and abatement subsidies. Emissions trading schemes
are based on two principles: a cap on aggregate emissions and tradeable emissionpermits that sum up to the cap. The imposition of a cap and allocation of permits
reduce uncertainty about total emission and its sources. The cap may be changed over
time so as to meet domestic and/or international targets of emission reductions. The
assumption underlying the implementation of a carbon-trading scheme is that
efficiency will be achieved through market-based redistribution of permits. However,
the redistribution of carbon-emission permits depends on the initial allocation of such
rights, which might be bias in favour of certain industries and consumers. For
example, the Australian Federal Government’s Green Paper on Emission Trading of
July 2008, indicates that firms in carbon-intensive industries such as aluminium
production and electrical power generation would initially receive free permits and
other compensations in order to maintain their operation and prevent them from
moving off-shore. The agricultural sector would not initially be restricted. Other small
polluters with large aggregate political influence would receive a cent-to-cent
compensation on any rise in petrol price stemming from the scheme through excise
tax reduction on petrol. Furthermore, the market of carbon emission permits is
unlikely to be perfectly competitive. Some traders will be large, better informed and
more sophisticated and hence will possess a significant market power. The
implementation of a carbon-emission-trading scheme involves a huge monitoring and
enforcement effort and is not necessarily the most efficient method.
An alternative method that does not require huge monitoring and enforcement
effort is based on application of a uniform carbon-tax rate on the purchasing of inputs
such as coal and petrol. The carbon-tax rate can be changed over time to meet
environmental targets. However, the notion of tax is unpopular among consumers and
governments are influenced by public sentiments. Furthermore, the inclusion of a
5

uniform carbon tax on certain inputs does not provide a perfectly adequate signal,
hence incentive, to users. For example, the carbon emissions by vehicles vary with
make, vintage, maintenance, traffic conditions, load and driver’s behaviour.
Optimally, the carbon tax rate should vary in accordance with these factors. There are
concerns that carbon-tax might be regressive as the share of spending on utilities,
electricity in particular, is higher for low-income earners. These concerns serve as an
argument in favour of subsidy of greener technologies and use of arable land and
other natural resources. Carbon tax on utilities such as electricity can be made
progressive for households: no tax up to a certain essential level, and thereafter rising
along a step-diagram. The carbon-tax rate can be varied over time to meet
environmental targets. The implementation of carbon tax is perceived to involve
greater uncertainty about emissions, but lower monitoring and enforcement costs, than
trading schemes. The effects of carbon-tax on emission-reduction, consumer-goods’
prices and welfare depend on the elasticity of demand to goods whose production is
carbon-fuel intensive. Comparisons of efficiency of price-incentive instruments and
quota instruments have been provided by Pizer (2002), Hoel and Karp (2002), Newell
and Pizer (2003) and Fischer and Newell (2008).
In addition to environmental and economic aspects, the choice of marketbased instruments depends on social and cultural aspects. There is a fear that
unilateral implementation of emission-tax, in particular, would reduce disposable
income, worsen terms of trade through price-inflation, and increase unemployment. In
many countries the introduction of new taxes is very unpopular. Unpopularity leads to
compromised implementation. It seems that North Europeans, Scandinavians in
particular, are more tolerant toward taxes, hence paying for pollution, than Americans
(cf. Berck and Helfand, 2010). Most notably, carbon tax has amounted to about 3% of
Sweden’s GDP (vis-à-vis about 1% in the US) and lowered Sweden’s aggregate
carbon emissions to a level below the target set in the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon tax has
also been implemented in Canada and New Zealand. Since 2008 a cap on the
aggregate carbon emissions of electrical power producers in a region comprising ten
north and central eastern states of the US has been set and tradable emission-permits
were initially auctioned at a clearing price of about 3 dollars per ton.
In July 2011 the Federal Government of Australia proposed the highest carbon
price—an initial price of 23 Australian dollars per ton of emissions generated by
about 500 largest polluters—for implementation on 1 July 2012. Households would
6

not be charged directly, but can expect higher prices of utilities. The less inelastic the
demand for utilities, the greater the expected price hike. To moderate the regressive
effect of the carbon price, all households with annual income lower than 80,000
dollars would enjoy some reduction in income tax. Those with annual income lower
than 18,300 dollars would be released from paying income tax and lodging a tax
return. In addition to the aforementioned general concerns, the following problems are
embedded in the Australian Federal Government’s carbon-pricing proposal. First, the
proposal allows the vast majority of direct emitters of carbon dioxide to free-ride,
though indirect moderating effect is expected. Second, some of the domestic major
industrial polluters and ninety percents of the households would be compensated. The
compensation would weaken their incentive to reduce emissions and would come at
the expense of alternative use of tax revenues. Third, the tax would not be applied on
the huge export of coal. Carbon emissions from burning Australian coal in the
importing countries are not negligible and affect all. Fourth, while some countries and
states price carbon emissions, most do not and free-ride. Fifth, although the Australian
Federal Government’s proposed carbon price is about four times higher than the
effective globally average, it is almost three-times lower than Nordhaus’ (2010)
estimate of 64 USD per ton already required in 2010 for limiting global warming to
two degrees Celsius.
The implementation of carbon tax by some affluent countries might not lead to
a reduction in global emissions. Levy (2011) has considered an interaction between
tax-collecting rich countries, abstaining rich countries and abstaining poor countries.
In his setting, the abstaining countries can lose reputation and suffer from guilt and
might overstate the tax’s emission-moderating effect. The computed equilibrium
reveals that even with loss of reputation and guilt, taxing emissions and directing the
revenues to green investment would not necessarily reduce global emissions, nor the
tax-collecting rich countries’ emissions. Nevertheless, a unilateral implementation of
the tax can be viewed as a moral obligation of rich countries to lead the way in
addressing the problem of global warming.

3. How is a Carbon Tax expected to work?
A basic model (which ignores, for simplicity, issues such as market-power,
uncertainty, risk aversion and time-preferences) is constructed to demonstrate the
effect of carbon tax on agents’ carbon-dioxide emissions and, subsequently, to
7

compute the desirable carbon-tax rate for achieving a predetermined atmospheric
stock, or a global welfare level. In that basic model, output increases concavely with
the use of energy extracted from burning fossil fuel. The carbon-dioxide level emitted
by each agent (household or firm) i=1,2,3,...,N is proportional to the quantity of fossil
fuel used by the agent and hence production can be represented as a concave function
of the agent’s level of carbon-dioxide emissions. The model employs the following
notations and basic specifications. The carbon-based energy used by agent i at time t
is denoted by Eit . The carbon emissions of agent i at time t, x it , are given by:
x it   i E it

(1)

where i  0 reflects the emission-intensity of the agent’s production process’ fuel
consumption.
Agent i’s output at t is denoted by yit and is given by:
yit  a i E it  bi E it 2 , ai  2bi  0 .

(2)

The price of energy for agent i at t is q it . The price of agent i’s product at t is pit . The
carbon-tax rate at t is flat and equal to t  0 .
Each agent i chooses her emission level at t to maximise her net cash-flow.
Noting that x it   i E it implies Eit  x it / i , each agent’s production function can be
expressed as:
yit  (a i /  i )x it  (a i /  i 2 )x it 2

(3)

and her imputed price of carbon before tax is q it /  i . Hence, the decision problem of
agent i is expressed as:

max{pit [(a i /  i )x it  (bi /  i 2 )x it 2 ]  [(q it /  i )   t ]x it }.
xi

(4)

The necessary and sufficient condition for maximum implies equality between the
marginal return on emissions and the full price of emissions—the sum of their
imputed price and tax rate:
p it [(a i /  i )  2(b i /  i 2 )x *it ]  (q it /  i )   t .

(5)

The net cash-flow maximising carbon-emission level at t for agent i is:

 ai  
1
x*it  

2
 2bi / i   2(bi / i )pit


 [(qit / i )  t ] .
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(6)

The effect of the emission tax on agent i’s abatement is weakened by the marginal net
revenue and by the rate in which the emissions’ marginal product diminishes.
Consequently, the stock (S) of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere at the end of period t
is:
N

St   x *it  St 1

(7)

i 1

where 0    1 represents the depletion rate of atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock
through photosynthesis, sinking and dissemination to space.
4. Some Possible Ways of Setting Carbon-Tax Rate
This section describes two possible approaches to carbon-tax setting. The first one
computes an atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock-targeting tax rate with abstinence of
some of the agents, whereas the second considers universal cooperation and computes
a welfare-maximising carbon-tax rate.

4.1. Atmospheric stock-targeting carbon-tax rate with abstinence
Let us assume that the world’s N agents can be classified into a group of N1 identical
agents, with a1 , b1 , p1t , q1t , who cooperate and pay a carbon-tax 1t  0 that limits the
stock of atmospheric carbon dioxide at the end of period t to a targeted level Ŝt , and
N-N1 identical agents, with a 2 , b 2 , p 2t , q 2t , who abstain ( 2t  0 ). In this scenario, the
carbon tax-rate set by the group of the willing and cooperating agents satisfies the
following equality:
Ŝt  N1x1t*  (N  N1 )x *2 t  St 1 .

(8)

Recalling (6),


 a1  
1
x1t*  
 [(q1t / 1 )  1t ]

2
 2b1 / 1   2(b1 / 1 )p1t 

(9)

and

 a2  
1
x*2t  

2
 2b2 /  2   2(b2 /  2 )p2t


 [(q 2t /  2 )


and
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(10)



 a1 
1
*
Ŝt  N1 
 [(q1t / 1 )  1t ]
  N1 
2
2b
/
2(b
/
)p


1
1
1t 
 1 1


(11)

 a2

q 2t /  2
 (N  N1 ) 

  St 1.
2
 2b 2 /  2 2(b 2 /  2 )p 2t 

Consequently, the carbon-tax rate paid by the group of the willing and cooperating
members is:
 a2
 a1 
q 2t /  2

N1 
  (N  N1 ) 
2
 2b1 / 1 
 2b 2 /  2 2(b 2 /  2 )p 2t
1t* 
2(b1 / 12 )p1t / N1


  St 1

 (q1t / 1 ) .

(12)

By substituting this tax rate into equation (9), the emissions abated by a willing and
cooperating member are:


1
x1t*  
2
 2(b1 / 1 )p1t

 *
 1t


2q b p 
N114  N1a11 (N  N1 ) 2 [a 2  (q 2t / p2t )]


 St 1  1t3 1 1t  .
2
2 
1 N1 
4b1 p1t  2b1
2b2

(13)

When all of the N agents are identical (hence the agent-type index can be omitted)
willing and cooperating,
 a 
N
  St 1
2b /  

*
t 
 (q t / ) .
2(b /  2 )p t / N

(14)

and the emissions abated by each agent are, of course, smaller:


 *  N 4   Na
2q bp 
1
x  
 St 1  t3 t  .
 t  
2
2 
N 
 2(b /  )p t 
 (2bp t )   2b
*
1t

(15)

4.2. Global cooperation and a welfare-maximising carbon-tax rate
In this case of a cooperative world, the world’s regulator substitutes x*it

into her

objective function, a global welfare function (W); say, the sum of all the agents’ net
cash-flows, plus the carbon-tax revenues (redistributed through public services), and
minus the damage inflicted by the stock of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere.
Assuming that the benefit from the carbon-tax revenues generated through
redistribution and provision of public goods and investment by the world’s regulator
are equal to the forgone privately generated ones, the carbon tax payments and
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revenues can be omitted from W. The world’s regulator computes the carbon-tax rate
that maximises the global welfare function:
N


max  Wt   pit [(a i / i )x *it  (bi / i 2 )x *it 2 ]  (q it / i )x *it  D(St ) 

i 1



subject to the aforementioned atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock constraint. Here,
D(St ) represents the damage caused by the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock via
global warming. The damage is assumed to increase convexly in S (i.e., D, D  0 ) as
represented by the following second-order polynomial:
D t  1St  2St 2 , 1 , 2  0 .

(14)

By substituting the carbon-dioxide stock equation into the damage function and the
latter into Wt :
N

Wt   pit [((a i  qit ) / i )x*it  (bi / i 2 )x*it 2 ]
i 1

2

N

N

 1  x*it  St 1   2  x*it  St 1  .
 i1

 i 1


(15)

As the second-order condition is satisfied, the global welfare maximising carbondioxide tax can be computed from the following first-order condition:
*
dW(t) N
2
* dx it
  pi [((a i  q it ) / i )  2(bi / i )x it ]
d
d
i 1

dx*it
N *
 N dx *it
 1 
22   x it  St 1  
 0.
i 1 d
 i 1
 i 1 d
N

(16)

Recalling (6),

dx *it
1

d
2(bi / i 2 )pit

(17)

and the necessary condition for maximum global welfare can be expressed as:
N
N


qit
qit
1
(1
2
)
(
2
S
)










2 
1
2
t 1 
2
i 1 2(bi / i )
i 1  2(bi / i )pit 
i 1 2(bi / i )pit
N

N


a i i
1
o
(1
2
)
22 







t
2
2
2
i 1 4(bi / i ) pit
i 1  2(bi / i )pit 
N

Hence,
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.(18)



q it


(1  22 St 1 ) i 1  2(bi / i )pit 
o
t 
 N
(1  22 )


1



2
i 1  2(b i /  i )pit 
N

N
q it
a i i
 22 

2
i 1 2(b i /  i )
i 1 4(bi /  i ) pit

.
N


1
(1  22 ) 

2
i 1  2(b i /  i )pit 
N

.(19)

In the special case where all the N agents are identical,

ot 

(1  22St 1 )  (1  22  pit )q it / i  2 a i i / bi
(1  22 )

If the damage function is linear (i.e., 2  0 ), then in the case of non-identical agents

 q (1  pit ) 
  1    it

i 1  2(b i /  i )pit 
N

o
t

N



i 1



  2(b


1

2
i /  i )p it 

or

ot  1  (p t  1)(q t / )
in the case of identical agents. In the latter case, the implementation of the tax leads
each agent to reduce her emissions by:

x*t 

1  (p t  1)(q t / )
.
2(b /  2 )p t

5. Photosynthesis versus Emissions: Time-Variant Usable Land and Allocation
In the previous two sections a fixed rate of depletion of carbon-dioxide,  , was
assumed. In the real world, the carbon-dioxide’s depletion rate depends on the
intensity of photosynthesis and hence on the allocation of land between plants and
humans. Humans and plants compete on the Earth’s useable land. With L t denoting
the Earth’s total usable (for simplicity, uniform) land (in acres) and Lht the land
occupied by humans at period t, then L t  Lht is the land occupied by plants. Surface
warming changes the Earth’s usable land. Since surface warming is a function of the
stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the change in the Earth’s acreage of usable
land is:
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L t  L t 1  (St  St 1 ) .

(21)

In already warm regions surface warming diminishes usable land, whereas in cold
regions it increases the size of usable land. The scalar  is positive (negative) if the
overall effect of surface warming on Earth’s usable land is negative (positive).
The change in the stock of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere at t reflects the
imbalance between humans’ emissions and plants’ photosynthesis. With linearity in
land assumed (for simplicity) this change is:
St  St 1  [F(N t )Lht ]  (L t  Lht )

(22)

where F(N t )Lht is the aggregate human production function (with F is a concave in
N),   0 is emissions per unit of human output, and   0 is photosynthesis per acre.
By substituting the usable land equation into the carbon-dioxide stock equation,
(1  )(St  St 1 )  [F(N t )  ]Lht   L t 1 .

(23)

Let us reconsider the analytically simple case of targeting the atmospheric
stock of carbon dioxide. The above equality implies that in order to achieve a target
level of Ŝt (lower than St 1 ) units of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere the land
occupied by humans at t should not exceed:
Lht 

 L t 1  (1  )(St 1  Sˆ t )
F(N t )  

(24)

and the land occupied by plants at t should be at least:
Lpt  L t 

 L t 1  (1  )(St 1  Sˆ t )
.
F(N t )  

(25)

The land allocated to plants increases with the difference between the actual
atmospheric carbon stock at the end of the previous period and the target level but at a
rate that is moderated by the rates of land loss and photosynthesis. However, the total
effect of the photosynthesis rate is not clear a-priori:
Lpt   L t 1  (1  )(St 1  Sˆ t )  [(St 1  Sˆ t )  ][F(N t )  ]  

  0
[F(N t )  ]2
 


(26)

as
ˆ
ˆ
  (  1)(S

t 1  St )  [ (St 1  St )  ][F(N t )  ]
L t 1  
.
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